Perspective as Local Closure

A Companion Whitepaper to *Coherence as the Condition of Existence*

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Abstract

This whitepaper derives a consequence of the ontology established in Coherence as the Condition of Existence (hereafter, Coherence): that a perspective is a local instance of closure - closure indexed by a constraint regime. It explains why closure is unified, why multiple perspectives necessarily arise without partitioning admissibility, how perspectives relate without fusing or separating, and how closure-instances vary along independent axes of resolution (granularity) and richness (information density).

Keywords: coherence; admissibility; closure; constraint regime; local closure; perspective; records; temporal ordering

Assumptions

- Assumes the definitions and results in Coherence (especially: admissibility is undivided; eventhood is coherent closure; incoherence is non-instantiable).
- Introduces no additional metaphysical primitives beyond those already established in Coherence.

0. Orientation and scope

This whitepaper does not revise or restate the ontology established in Coherence. That work is taken as given. The present aim is narrower and downstream: to articulate a consequence that follows once closure is accepted as the nature of existence and admissibility as undivided. Specifically, the task is to make precise what a perspective is under this ontology, why multiple perspectives necessarily arise, and how such perspectives relate without invoking observers, privileged substrates, or additional metaphysical primitives.

The term perspective will therefore be used in a deliberately restricted sense. It does not refer to an epistemic viewpoint, a mental representation, or a subject standing apart from events. Nor does it denote an interpretive stance applied to an independently existing world. In this paper, perspective names a mode of eventhood itself: an instance of closure indexed by a constraint regime. The justification for this usage is not assumed at the outset; it is derived in the sections that follow.

Nothing in this paper privileges minds, brains, or human experience as ontological foundations. Neural systems, bodies, instruments, and environments will appear only insofar as they participate in constraint structures relevant to closure. Terms such as experience, observation, or consciousness are treated descriptively and only after the structural account is in place. No appeal is made to phenomenology, subjectivity, or cognitive architecture as primitive explanans.

The scope is intentionally limited. The paper does not address ethics, agency, meaning, or normativity. It does not propose a theory of consciousness, nor does it advance claims about what entities are conscious. It does not re-derive the formal results of Coherence or introduce new axioms. Its sole purpose is to clarify how unity, plurality, and locality obtain once existence is understood as closure in an undivided domain - and to show that what are ordinarily called perspectives can be identified precisely with local closure-instances without remainder.

If this clarification succeeds, no additional metaphysical machinery will be required. The concepts introduced here are not supplements to the underlying ontology but refinements of its consequences.

Definitions

- Admissibility: the undivided domain in which differentiation can occur.
- Differentiation: structured distinction-making prior to closure.
- Closure: global resolution of differentiation into a determinate instance.
- Constraint regime: the configuration of couplings and discriminations indexing a closure.
- Local: constraint-relative (not spatially interior).
- Record: constraint-bearing structure embedded in a closure that restricts compatible pasts.
- Perspective: a local closure (closure indexed by a constraint regime).

1. Closure as eventhood

Under the ontology established in Coherence, existence is not a background substance, container, or domain upon which events occur. What exists are events, and eventhood itself is not primitive. Eventhood is closure: the resolution of differentiation into a determinate instance within admissibility. To say that something exists is simply to say that differentiation has closed coherently.

This claim is not an additional metaphysical thesis layered on top of physics or experience. It is a minimal condition implicit in any occurrence whatsoever. If an occurrence is to count as an occurrence - if it is to be distinguishable from non-occurrence - then the differentiations that constitute it must resolve as a whole. There is no sense in which a partially resolved differentiation could count as an event, because unresolved incompatibility would prevent anything definite from being the case.

For this reason, coherence is not a governing principle, law, or preference imposed on reality. It is not something that "enforces" order or excludes disorder. Rather, it is a consequence of where differentiation occurs. Admissibility is undivided: there is no internal partition, compartment, or elsewhere in which incompatible differentiations could persist without resolution. Incoherence is therefore not prohibited. It is non-instantiable. Differentiation that cannot close does not produce a flawed or unstable event; it produces no event at all.

Once closure is identified as the nature of eventhood, many familiar ontological categories lose their foundational status. States, outcomes, facts, and occurrences are not primitive entities that must be explained in addition to closure. They are descriptive names for closure-instances as modeled, tracked, or re-identified within various theoretical or practical frameworks. They do not stand behind closure as prior constituents. Closure is the condition under which anything can be definite enough to count as a state, an outcome, or a fact in the first place.

This point is essential for what follows. If eventhood were primitive, perspectives would have to be added as secondary features - ways of accessing or interpreting events from the outside. But if eventhood is closure, and closure is the only mode of existence, then any candidate for "perspective" must itself be understood in terms of closure. The task is not to explain how perspectives arise in addition to events, but to determine whether what are ordinarily called perspectives can be identified with certain kinds of closure-instances directly.

2. Unity as the undivided condition

If existence is closure, and closure occurs only within admissibility, then unity is not an additional feature that must be imposed on events. Unity follows directly from the undivided character of admissibility itself. Admissibility is the condition under which differentiation can occur at all, and it does not admit internal partitions. There is no internal region of admissibility that could host unresolved remainder, contradiction, or mutually exclusive differentiations in isolation from one another.

For this reason, closure cannot instantiate partially. A partial closure would require that some differentiations resolve while others remain unresolved within the same admissible domain. But

this is incoherent under the present ontology. If incompatibility remained unresolved, there would be nothing definite enough to count as an event. There is no ontological space in which “half-resolved” existence could reside. Whatever exists exists as a unified closure, because closure is global resolution within an undivided domain.

This point allows unity to be stated without appeal to any metaphysical substance, binding force, or holistic agency. Unity is not something that happens to events after they occur, nor is it something that must be actively produced. It is simply the form closure takes when differentiation resolves in a domain that cannot be subdivided. To exist is already to be unified in this minimal but decisive sense.

It is important to be precise about what unity does and does not mean here. Unity does not imply totality, completeness, or maximal inclusion. A unified closure need not include everything that could possibly exist, nor does it collapse all differentiations into a single indistinct whole. Unity means only that whatever differentiation closes does so as a whole, without remainder or internal contradiction. Many distinct closures can exist without violating unity, because unity is a condition on each closure-instance, not a requirement that there be only one closure.

This clarification is essential for avoiding a common mistake. Unity is often taken to imply either a single all-encompassing event or a metaphysical “One” of which particular events are fragments or expressions. Nothing of that kind is required here. Unity applies locally to closure-instances, not globally as a demand that existence collapse into a single event. Admissibility is undivided, but closure is not unique. Unity, properly understood, is compatible with plurality, provided that plurality is understood as multiplicity of unified closures rather than fragmentation of a unified whole.

With unity grounded in this way, the path is cleared to ask how multiple unified closures can arise, and what it could mean to speak of locality or perspective without reintroducing division into admissibility.

3. Perspective as local closure

If closure is the nature of eventhood and unity follows from the undivided character of admissibility, then any legitimate account of perspective must be framed in these terms. A perspective cannot be an added layer placed on top of events, nor can it be a standpoint external to closure from which events are viewed. Under the present ontology, there is no such outside. What exists are closures, and nothing exists in addition to them.

A perspective is therefore identified directly with a closure-instance. More precisely, a perspective is a local closure. The term local does not indicate spatial location, interiority, or bounded containment. It indicates constraint-relativity. A local closure is a closure indexed by a particular constraint regime - by a specific configuration of relations, couplings, and discriminations that determine which differentiations can resolve together and which cannot.

To call a closure a perspective is to emphasize that it does not arise under all possible constraints, but under a limited and selective set. The closure is unified and globally coherent within

admissibility, yet it is shaped by a particular constraint geometry. That geometry determines what distinctions can be made, what alternatives are excluded, and what structure is fixed in the closure-instance. In this sense, perspective is not something that happens to closure; it is a way of describing closure as it occurs relative to constraints.

Because every perspective is a closure, all perspectives are ontologically equal in the only sense that matters at the base level. None is a partial fragment of a more fundamental event. None is merely an appearance of something that exists more fully elsewhere. Each perspective is a complete instance of existence-as-closure, satisfying the same requirement of global coherence as any other event.

This identification dissolves several familiar confusions at once. There is no need to posit a subject that “has” a perspective, no need to introduce an observer that stands apart from events, and no need to imagine a hidden, perspective-free reality behind what appears. The perspective is not a view of the event; it is the event, as closed under a particular constraint regime. Nothing further is required to account for its existence.

At the same time, identifying perspectives with local closures does not yet explain why there are many perspectives rather than one. It only establishes what a perspective is once closure is taken as fundamental. The question of plurality - how multiple unified closures can arise without dividing admissibility - must be addressed next.

4. Why there are many perspectives

Once a perspective is identified as a local closure - closure relative to a constraint regime - the existence of many perspectives is no longer puzzling. Plurality is not something that must be added to the ontology or explained by appeal to hidden divisions in being. It follows directly from constraint variation. Constraint regimes differ, and where constraints differ, the differentiations that can resolve differ as well. Different closures therefore occur.

Because constraint regimes are not globally identical across all couplings, closure cannot be unique; distinct regimes index distinct closure-instances.

Constraint variation is ubiquitous. Bodies differ in structure and coupling. Interfaces differ in what they can discriminate. Environments differ in the relations they afford. Histories differ in the constraints they deliver forward. Because closure is indexed by constraints, and constraints are not uniform across all situations, closure-instances are necessarily multiple. Plurality is the default outcome of closure in a world where constraint geometries vary.

This plurality does not divide admissibility. Admissibility remains undivided and without internal partitions. Multiple closures do not require separate domains in which to occur, nor do they imply that being fractures into independent regions. The undivided character of admissibility constrains each closure to be unified, but it does not restrict closure to a single instance. Unity applies to closure-instances individually, not to existence as a whole in the sense of uniqueness.

It is therefore a mistake to think of perspectives as fragments of a larger closure or as partial views that would need to be assembled into a more complete whole. A fragment would be something ontologically incomplete, requiring supplementation elsewhere in order to exist fully. But under the present ontology, incomplete existence is not available. A perspective is not a shard of closure awaiting integration; it is closure. Distinct perspectives do not compose into a super-perspective by aggregation, nor are they incomplete without such composition.

Nor is plurality explained by appeal to a single underlying closure that somehow appears differently from different standpoints. That picture presupposes an event that exists independently of its closures, which contradicts the identification of eventhood with closure itself. There is no deeper closure behind the many closures. There are simply many closure-instances, each unified, each globally coherent, each indexed by a distinct constraint regime.

Plurality, then, is not an anomaly to be resolved. It is a straightforward consequence of taking closure seriously as the nature of existence. With this in place, the next task is to correct a common misinterpretation: the tendency to locate closure inside a privileged subsystem, such as the nervous system, rather than in the coupled interaction that actually defines the constraint regime.

5. Interaction-closure, not neural closure

The identification of perspective with local closure is easily misunderstood if closure is tacitly relocated into a privileged subsystem, most commonly the nervous system. This misinterpretation reintroduces, without explicit acknowledgment, a container model of existence: events are treated as occurring inside a system, which is itself situated within a larger environment. Under such a picture, perspective becomes something housed in the brain, and closure is mistaken for a process internal to neural tissue. This picture is incompatible with the ontology established in Coherence.

What is actualized as experience is not generated by neural constraints alone; it is the closure of the coupled organism-environment constraint regime as a single instance.

Closure is not a thing that happens at a location. It is not a process that unfolds inside a bounded interior. Closure is the event itself: the resolution of differentiation under a constraint regime. A perspective, as a local closure, therefore cannot be identified with activity inside the nervous system alone. The nervous system does not contain the closure. Rather, it participates in a constraint geometry through which closure occurs.

A perspective is the closure of a coupled situation: nervous system, body, and environment functioning together as a single constraint regime. Sensory interfaces, motor feedback, environmental regularities, and internal dynamics jointly determine which differentiations can resolve and which cannot. The nervous system plays a crucial role because it organizes and stabilizes constraints with great sophistication, but it does not define the boundary of the event. The closure-instance is not confined to neural processes any more than it is confined to external stimuli. It is constituted by their interaction.

This clarification also corrects a common misuse of the language of entanglement. The relevant point is not that particles in different locations are mysteriously linked. What matters is that the constraints governing differentiation do not factor into independent parts. When a constraint regime is coupled in such a way that differentiation cannot be decomposed into separable components that would close independently, the resulting closure is necessarily joint relative to that regime. The unity of the perspective follows from the unity of the constraint geometry, not from any binding operation performed by the brain.

It is therefore more accurate to speak of interaction-closure than of neural closure. What closes is not a subsystem, but a state of affairs defined by interaction. The closure-instance is an event that resolves under the constraints delivered by the coupled system as a whole. Treating closure as neural interiority obscures this structure and invites confusion about where events occur and how perspectives arise.

Finally, this view clarifies the status of persistence. A perspective is not a persisting object that endures through time. It is an instance of closure. The apparent continuity of a mind or self reflects stability in the constraint geometry across successive closure-instances, not the endurance of a single event. At any moment, what exists is the closure-instance itself: the unified resolution of differentiation under the constraints delivered by the coupled interaction at that time.

6. Relationship between perspectives: neither together nor separated

If each perspective is a closure-instance - unified, globally coherent, and indexed by a particular constraint regime - then the relationship between perspectives must be understood in a way that respects both unity and plurality without reintroducing division into admissibility. Two common intuitions must be rejected at once: that perspectives somehow share their contents, and that perspectives are isolated in separate ontological compartments.

Perspectives do not share phenomenology. A closure is a unified instance. There is nothing “inside” it that can be partially accessed or entered by another closure without undermining its unity. For this reason, experiences do not mix, overlap, or fuse. The familiar privacy of experience is not an epistemic limitation imposed by ignorance or lack of access; it is a structural consequence of closure as eventhood. If two closures shared a single phenomenological interior, they would not be two closures. They would be one.

At the same time, perspectives are not ontologically separated in the way spatial metaphors suggest. Separation would require internal boundaries within admissibility - regions of being in which one closure could exist apart from another. But admissibility, as established in Coherence, is undivided. There is no internal elsewhere. There is no ontological gap across which perspectives must somehow reach. To speak of perspectives as “separate worlds” or “distinct realms” is therefore as misleading as to speak of them as sharing a common experiential field.

The correct relationship is thus neither fusion nor division. Perspectives are neither together as one experience nor separated by any boundary in being. They are instantiated as distinct closures within undivided admissibility. Their distinctness is secured by constraint-relativity, not by partitioned existence.

Distinctness here is not spatial separation but non-identity of constraint-indexed closures: different global resolutions under different regimes.

How, then, do perspectives relate at all? They relate structurally, through constraint coupling and compatibility. Interaction between perspectives is not the sharing of experience; it is the mutual modification of constraint regimes. Signals, actions, and environmental changes do not transmit phenomenology from one closure to another. They alter the constraints under which subsequent closures occur. Communication, on this view, is the coordination of closure-instances via shared or coupled constraints, not the transfer of inner contents.

Meaning likewise does not reside in a substance passed between perspectives. It arises when a receiving perspective closes under constraints shaped by interaction with another perspective. What persists across perspectives is not experience itself, but structure: correlations, regularities, and constraint-bearing relations that remain compatible within admissibility.

This account preserves realism without collapsing into either solipsism or collective subjectivity. Perspectives are fully real, fully unified, and fully distinct as closure-instances, yet they are instantiated as distinct closures and coordinate within a single undivided domain. With this relational structure in place, it becomes possible to distinguish different kinds of perspectives by the character of their closure - specifically, by how finely they resolve differentiation and how much structure they embed. This motivates the distinction between resolution and richness.

7. Resolution and richness

Although all perspectives are ontologically equal as closure-instances, they are not identical in character. Closure guarantees unity and coherence, but it does not fix how much differentiation is resolved or how much structure is embedded in a given instance. These variations can be described precisely along two independent axes: resolution and richness.

Resolution concerns the granularity at which differentiation is fixed by closure under a given constraint regime. A high-resolution closure excludes many alternatives and determines fine distinctions: many potential differences are settled decisively. A low-resolution closure, by contrast, fixes only coarse distinctions, leaving a wide range of alternatives compatible at the level being resolved. Resolution is determined by constraint discrimination. The more discriminating the constraints, the smaller the space of admissible closures, and the finer the granularity at which differentiation must resolve.

This notion of resolution allows measurement to be described without introducing a special metaphysical process. Measurement is not an operation that collapses an otherwise indeterminate reality. It is a refinement of constraints that increases discriminatory power and thereby forces higher-resolution closure. What changes is not the nature of closure but the constraint regime under which closure occurs.

Richness, by contrast, concerns the information density embedded in the closed structure. A rich closure contains extensive internal organization: many coupled degrees of freedom, layered relations, and structures capable of functioning as records. A sparse closure contains relatively

little such structure. Richness is typically supported by system complexity, but it is not identical to resolution. A closure may be highly resolved yet informationally simple, or informationally dense while resolving only a limited range of distinctions at a given moment.

The independence of these axes is crucial. Without it, differences between perspectives would be forced into a single dimension, inviting hierarchy or privilege. By distinguishing resolution from richness, it becomes possible to describe variation in perspective without implying that some closures are more real, more unified, or more fundamental than others. All closures equally exist. Resolution and richness describe how existence is structured in a given instance, not whether it exists.

A closure may be highly resolved yet structurally sparse, or structurally dense while only coarse distinctions are fixed in a given instance.

This distinction also clarifies why perspectives can differ dramatically in character while remaining equally valid closure-instances. A simple instrument may enforce high resolution with minimal richness. A complex organism may embed immense richness while resolving only certain distinctions at a time. Both are perspectives. Both are closures. Their difference lies in the structure of their constraints, not in their ontological status.

With these axes in place, it becomes possible to address how closure-instances connect across time: how past closures constrain future ones, how records function, and how temporal ordering emerges without invoking a primitive flow. This is the role of the next section.

8. Constraint inheritance, records, and temporal ordering

A closure does not merely resolve differentiation under a given constraint regime; it also delivers constraints forward. Once a closure occurs, the structure it instantiates - its internal relations, correlations, and stabilized distinctions - becomes part of the constraint regime under which subsequent closures must resolve. Continuity across events does not require a governing law that pushes reality forward in time. It requires only compatibility between closure-instances mediated by inherited constraints.

These inherited constraints are often described, at a descriptive level, as records. A record is any structure embedded in a closure that restricts which past closures are compatible with the present one. Memory traces, physical marks, environmental correlations, and stored signals all play this same ontological role. They are not representations that point backward in time; they are constraint-bearing structures that limit which histories could have produced the present closure.

Because closures can embed records, the present typically constrains the past. Retrodiction is therefore possible: from a present closure, one can rule out many incompatible past closures. This does not imply that the past is always uniquely determined. When records are coarse, lossy, or sparse, many distinct micro-histories may remain compatible with the same present macro-closure. Determinability depends on the richness and resolution of record structure, not on a metaphysical principle of uniqueness.

Future closures are constrained in a parallel way. The internal structure of a closure - what distinctions are fixed, what relations are stabilized, what records are embedded - restricts which differentiations can coherently resolve next. Nothing needs to “carry” the system forward. Closure-instances simply occur under constraint regimes shaped by prior closures.

What is ordinarily called time can be described within this framework as an ordering of closure-instances induced by asymmetric constraint inheritance. Later closures typically embed records of earlier ones, while earlier closures do not embed records of later ones. This asymmetry is structural, not metaphysical. No primitive temporal flow, global clock, or external ordering parameter is required. Temporal direction emerges from the way constraints accumulate and how records are embedded across sequences of closures.

This account preserves everything that is operationally needed for temporal reasoning - continuity, memory, causation-like ordering - without introducing time as a fundamental substance or dimension in which events reside. Time, like perspective, is a way closure is structured, not an entity in addition to closure.

This is a structural account of temporal ordering as constraint inheritance; it does not by itself settle thermodynamic or cosmological arrows, though it can be made compatible with them.

With this structure in place, it becomes possible to address one final clarification: the status of consciousness within this ontology, and why treating perspective as local closure neither privileges human experience nor collapses into indiscriminate attribution.

9. De-privileging consciousness

If perspective is identified with local closure, then no particular kind of system is privileged as the exclusive site of actuality. Consciousness, in the ordinary sense of the term, is not an ontological primitive and does not mark a boundary between what exists and what merely occurs physically. It names a class of closure regimes characterized by particular patterns of resolution and richness, not a special mode of being.

In this whitepaper, perspective does not entail consciousness; it denotes constraint-indexed closure, which may or may not support the richer regimes ordinarily labeled conscious.

Under this ontology, human consciousness is one way closure can occur, not the condition under which closure occurs at all. Human perspectives typically involve high informational richness: dense internal organization, extensive record embedding, and complex constraint coupling across time. They also often exhibit relatively high resolution with respect to certain distinctions, especially those relevant to action, language, and social coordination. These features explain the character of human experience without elevating it to metaphysical primacy.

At the same time, nothing in the structure of closure restricts perspectives to biological or neural systems. Any coupled constraint regime capable of supporting closure can, in principle, instantiate a perspective. This does not entail that all systems are conscious, nor does it license indiscriminate attribution. The ontology does not assign consciousness everywhere by default. It

simply refuses to treat consciousness as a prerequisite for existence. Closure is prior; consciousness, where it appears, is descriptive of certain closure regimes.

This position avoids two symmetrical errors. It avoids anthropocentrism, which treats human consciousness as the sole locus of genuine reality or eventhood. And it avoids naive panpsychism, which treats consciousness as ubiquitous by fiat. Neither move is supported by the ontology of closure. What exists are closure-instances. Some of these closures are described, at a higher level, as conscious because of their structure. Others are not. No further metaphysical distinction is required.

By de-privileging consciousness in this way, the account preserves both rigor and openness. It does not foreclose inquiry into which systems can support rich or high-resolution closure regimes, but it also does not smuggle in evaluative or normative criteria at the ontological level. Consciousness becomes a topic for structural analysis, not a boundary of being.

With this clarification in place, the remaining task is simply to compress the argument and state clearly what has - and has not - been added to the underlying ontology.

10. Compression and sufficiency

Once closure is taken as the nature of existence, the structure required to account for unity, plurality, and perspective is minimal and complete. Admissibility is undivided. Closure is the resolution of differentiation within that undivided domain. Unity follows necessarily, not as a metaphysical add-on, but as the form closure takes when incompatibility has nowhere to reside.

A perspective, on this account, is not a viewpoint imposed on events and not a subject standing apart from reality. It is a local closure: a closure indexed by a particular constraint regime. Multiple perspectives arise because constraint regimes vary. This plurality does not fragment admissibility, and it does not require a hidden perspective-free reality behind appearances. Each perspective is a complete closure-instance, globally coherent and ontologically equal to every other.

Perspectives neither fuse nor stand apart as isolated worlds. They are instantiated as distinct closures within undivided admissibility and relate only through structural compatibility and constraint coupling. Interaction, communication, and coordination occur through the modification of constraints, not through the sharing of phenomenology. Differences between perspectives are captured without hierarchy by the independent axes of resolution and richness.

Nothing further is required. No observers, substrates, or binding forces have been introduced. No additional primitives have been added to those already established in Coherence. The present account does not explain perspective by appeal to something deeper than closure; it identifies perspective with closure under constraints.

If the argument succeeds, it leaves no remainder. What exists are closures, resolving under constraints, within an undivided domain. Perspectives are not views upon that process. They are that process, locally resolved.

Appendix A. Formal correspondence with Coherence

This appendix introduces no new primitives. It provides a compact correspondence map from the formal core of Coherence as the Condition of Existence (hereafter, Coherence) to the terms used in this whitepaper: constraint regime, local closure, perspective, coupling, resolution, and richness. The aim is not to construct a second independent formal core, but to state these terms as downstream definitional extensions of Coherence's primitives.

A.1 Imported primitives (from Coherence)

Assume Coherence's primitives and results. The following names are used as placeholders for whichever of Coherence's equivalent formalisms (relational / model-theoretic / sheaf) you treat as authoritative.

- **Admissibility (A):** An undivided domain in which differentiation can occur.
- **Differentiation (d):** A structured pattern of distinctions prior to closure.
- **Coherence (Coh(d)):** A satisfiable compatibility condition for d within A.
- **Closure (Cl(d)):** A total resolution of a coherent differentiation into a determinate instance (an event).
- **Non-instantiability of incoherence:** If not Coh(d), then Cl(d) does not exist as an event-instance.

A.2 Constraint regimes and local closure

A constraint regime is treated as an index on admissible differentiations. Formally, represent a regime κ as a predicate or sieve over differentiations selecting those compatible with a given coupling/interface.

- **Constraint regime (κ):** An index selecting a subset $D_\kappa \subseteq D$ of differentiations admissible under κ.
- **Local coherence ($Coh_\kappa(d)$):** Coh(d) together with κ-admissibility: $d \in D_\kappa$.
- **Local closure ($Cl_\kappa(d)$):** Closure of d relative to κ: Cl(d) with the understanding that $d \in D_\kappa$.
- **Perspective (P_κ):** A local closure-instance: $P_\kappa := Cl_\kappa(d)$ for some κ-admissible d.

Interpretive note. "Local" means κ-indexed (constraint-relative), not spatially interior. A perspective is not something added to closure; it is closure described at the level of its constraint index.

A.3 Relations between perspectives

Relations between perspectives are modeled structurally, as constraint coupling and constraint update—not as sharing or transfer of interior content.

- **Coupling / influence:** A relation between regimes κ_1 and κ_2 that permits constraint-bearing updates across closures (signals/actions).
- **Constraint update (U):** A map $U: (\kappa, s) \mapsto \kappa'$ where s is a constraint-bearing signal/record embedded in a closure.

- **Compatibility:** A predicate indicating whether constraints can jointly restrict a subsequent closure without contradiction.

Communication is captured as a sequence of updates $\kappa \mapsto \kappa'$ induced by closures embedding signals/records. No axiom of phenomenological sharing is introduced or required.

A.4 Propositions (downstream of Coherence)

Proposition A1 (Unity of local closure).

If $Cl_\kappa(d)$ exists, then it is unified (no partial closure).

Sketch. In Coherence, closure is global resolution within undivided admissibility A. If a remainder were left unresolved, the instance would fail to be determinate and thus would not be an event. Therefore any existing Cl(d) is unified; the κ-index does not change this, it only restricts which d are admissible.

Proposition A2 (Plurality from non-equivalent regimes).

If κ_1 and κ_2 are not equivalent (they do not select the same admissible differentiations up to isomorphism), then the induced perspective-classes need not coincide: in general there exist $d_1 \in D_{\kappa_1}$ and $d_2 \in D_{\kappa_2}$ such that $Cl_{\kappa_1}(d_1) \neq Cl_{\kappa_2}(d_2)$.

Sketch. If two indices produced identical closure-instances for every admissible differentiation, they would be equivalent as constraint indices (imposing no distinguishable restriction). Non-equivalence therefore implies, at least in principle, distinct closure-instances under distinct regimes.

Proposition A3 (Non-fusion).

Distinct perspectives do not share an interior: if $P_{\kappa_1} \neq P_{\kappa_2}$, there is no single closure-instance whose restriction yields both as the same event.

Sketch. If one event-instance E "contained" both interiors as the same closure, then P_{κ_1} and P_{κ_2} would not be distinct closures but re-descriptions of a single closure-instance. Coherence's totality/uniqueness of closure (no unresolved remainder; no competing total resolutions for the same instance) blocks such fusion.

Proposition A4 (Interaction as constraint update, not content transfer).

Influence between perspectives is represented as κ-updates across a sequence of closures: P_κ embeds signals/records that induce κ' for subsequent closures in coupled regimes.

Sketch. Coherence allows closures to embed record-structure that restricts later admissible differentiations (constraint inheritance). Treat signals/actions as such record-structures. Then interaction is exactly constraint update U: $(\kappa, s) \mapsto \kappa'$.

Proposition A5 (Resolution monotonicity under refinement).

If κ′ refines κ (κ′ ⊆κ, meaning D_κ′ D_κ), then resolution does not decrease: the closure under κ′ fixes distinctions at least as finely as under κ.

Sketch. Refinement restricts admissible differentiations and therefore admissible closures. Any reasonable resolution functional—e.g., a measure of discrimination depth or −log of the remaining alternative space—is monotone under such restriction.

Proposition A6 (Independence of resolution and richness).

Resolution (granularity of fixed distinctions) and richness (information density of embedded structure/records) are independent axes: there exist closure-instances with high resolution but low richness, and closure-instances with high richness but comparatively coarse resolution.

Sketch. This is witnessed by commonplace model classes: instruments can enforce sharp discrimination on a small set of variables (high resolution, low internal structure), while complex systems can embed extensive record-structure yet only resolve a limited set of distinctions in a given instance (high richness, coarse resolution). No hierarchy follows: all such instances, if closed, equally exist.

Guardrail. In this paper, perspective does not entail consciousness; it denotes constraint-indexed closure, which may or may not support the richer regimes ordinarily labeled conscious.

A.5 Notes on instantiation across Coherence's formalisms

The correspondence above is deliberately abstract and can be instantiated within whichever formal core you treat as primary:

- **Relational / partial-relation formalization:** κ corresponds to a restricted interface (partial relation/function context) selecting admissible extensions; local closure is closure of an admissible extension under that restriction.
- **Model-theoretic formalization:** κ corresponds to a theory/context (or partial assignment) restricting admissible models; local closure corresponds to completion/selection under κ.
- **Sheaf-theoretic formalization:** κ corresponds to a context/open with restriction maps; local closure corresponds to a compatible section whose existence is secured only when gluing (closure) holds.

In all cases, the appendix's point is identical: perspective is closure indexed by constraints. Nothing beyond Coherence's primitives is required.